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Abstract 
 
Despite currently growing sociolinguistic research on Spanglish, it is a very peculiar 
linguistic variety, which cannot be understood without a careful analysis of its 
neurolinguistic background. This paper argues that a theoretical neurolinguistic view on 
Spanglish has to consider the cortex, where English-like words are located, the limbic 
system, where Spanish paradigms are stored, and the bundles of nerves that bind up 
both of them. Spanglish is an example of detranslation, a kind of negative translation. 
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1. The neurolinguistics of Spanglish 
Unlike much of the work on Spanglish, which is based on contemporary data, the study 
of the neurolinguistics of Spanglish is necessarily confined to theoretical abstraction. 
We know what people that speak Spanglish do, but we ignore how they do. 
Neurolinguistics has certainly penetrated the limits of  experimental research and 
nowadays it benefits a lot of experimental techniques such as PET, EEG, or fMR. 
However the time has not yet arrived that we can ask people to lend on a stretcher, put 
their head into a kind of helmet, get relaxed and begin to speak Spanglish fluently 
whereas a monitor registers the variation of blood quantity in some areas of the brain. 
This is due to the fact that Spanglish absolutely depends on the context of use for it is 
not a new American language, but a new American way of speaking. You can ask some 
test subjects to associate a list of Spanish words or a list of English words to a prompt 
word, but to ask them that the list be of Spanglish words is nonsense because every 
word is prompted by its own external circumstance. This means that Spanglish is not a 
linguistic competence we store by heart in the brain, but a linguistic performance we 
develop occasionally in bilingual contexts of the USA (also in Gibraltar or everywhere 
Spanish and English have met). Spanish and English are linguistic systems that have 
each its own performance; Spanglish is a performance that holds on the linguistic 
systems of Spanish and English either simultaneously or alternatively:  
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Figure 1 
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It is by no means clear how are organized in the bilingual brain the two coexisting 
linguistic systems represented by contiguous squares in the picture. As it is known, 
Ervin and Osgood (1954) distinguished two possibilities, the compound and the 
coordinate bilingualism. When people acquire two languages in the same context they 
become compound bilinguals and have compound systems, i.e., systems in which two 
languages simply constitute two different ways of encoding the same set of referential 
meanings. When people acquire two languages in separate contexts, however, they 
become coordinate bilinguals and have coordinate systems i.e. systems in which the 
referential meanings encoded in the two languages differ to a considerable extent:  
Figure 2 
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The distinction by Ervin & Osgood emphasized the acquisition settings, but did not 
explain how should the respective minds of the bilinguals look like. Since then many 
proposals have been made in order to think them up. Penfield and Roberts (1959) 
supported the critical period hypothesis that establishes a sharp distinction between first 
language acquisition and second language acquisition, and states that after the crucial 
time in which children acquire their first language, they will never achieve a full 
command of language, which has been shown by many experimental findings and case 
studies (Genesee, 1982;  Johnson & Newport, 1989; Birdsong & Molis, 2001). As a 
consequence, first language ought to exhibit a mental organization which does not 
coincide with that of second language. This topic is related to brain lateralization. It has 
been supposed that the differences between L1 and L2 are due to the brain hemisphere 
where each linguistic ability is settled, L1 being supposed to belong to the dominant 
(generally the left) hemisphere, L2 to the dominated (usually the right) hemisphere 
(Albert and Obler, 1978). Some counterexamples challenged this hypothesis –Proverbio 
& Mado (2011) showed that linguistic functions are less lateralized in poliglots than in 
monolinguals– and, anyway, lateralization hypothesis does not allow us to figure out the 
neural patterning of coordinate brain vs. the neural patterning of compound brain. 
 
2. Memory 
A set of neurological mechanisms has been investigated in order to understand the 
neurobiological foundations of memory. However, the interesting thing here is to point 
out that at the same time they fulfil a crucial role in categorization, since in order to 
mentally construe a category, beforehand we need to have stored various similar stimuli 
in memory. A conceptual category is the result of abstracting what the elements of a 
group of stimuli have in common thus constructing a proto-stimulus. Said proto-
stimulus could be a visual image – the general image of what an apple is, – a concept – 
the idea of ¨apple¨-, a word – the word apple-, etc.  And yet more: the mental category 
that supports the word apple shares several neural connections with the mental  category 
that supports the idea of “apple” and with the mental category that supports the general 
visual image of apple: 
clac 56/2013, 3-25 
lópez-garcía: detranslation 7  
Figure 3 
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The visual image of the apple is the result of receiving successive visual images of 
concrete apples: the first of which did not produce a category (probably a wider 
category was built which also included pears, oranges or peaches), but soon the 
category was formed. Thanks to said categories we are capable of recognising what I 
see as an apple, the idea I am forming in my mind as the concept “apple” or the sounds I 
hear as a realization of the word apple. In all of these cases the stimulus was acquired 
along with a stronger stimulus, but then, without this stronger stimulus, it was enough to 
simply evoke the context in which it occurred. Consider the following photograph of an 
apple: 
Figure 4: A perceived apple 
 
How, in fact, do we know we are talking about an apple when we have not seen this 
exact tree and piece of fruit before? Probably because, compared to what happens with 
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many other types of wild fruit that we happen to see as we are walking in the 
countryside and whose names we do not know, our retinas have been exposed many 
times to apples, associating them with strong stimuli throughout our lives: the mother 
who gave us an apple for an afternoon snack, the garden we used to play in and where 
we picked up apples from the ground, and the supermarket shelves when we used to go 
shopping, etc. The result of all of this is that visual images of apples have been 
reinforced and have become recorded in memory as a proto-image of an apple. 
Similarly, proto-concepts and proto-words are formed. 
Edelman’s (1987, 1988) TNGS (the Theory of Neuronal Group Selection) constitutes a 
plausible hypothesis about how these proto-images form. Its empirical foundation is 
built on the well-known observation that, often, neighbouring cells which have received 
the same stimulus establish a synaptic correlation between themselves (Singer, 1979), 
which demonstrates that proximity contributes to the formation of webs. However, it is 
also the case that two isogenic daphnias (Macagno et al., 1973) with the same number 
of neurons were very different as regards their connectional ramifications, which brings 
to mind the case of the twins which, despite having the same genotype, developed  in 
completely different ways phenotypically. Edelman concluded that the neurons 
organised themselves in primary records consisting of groups of neurons in whose 
interior webs of variable neurons were established by processes of migration, adherence 
or neuronal death, similar to those of Darwinian natural selection (here termed neuronal 
selection): 
Figure 5: Primary records 
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The next step is the reinforcement of some of the synapses. Following on from the 
numerous experiments carried out by Hubel and Wiesel (1969), the stimuli in the 
surrounding area can induce a selective response to the primary records, each of which 
is sensitive to a determined type of stimuli: hence we get to the secondary records, 
which are characterised by certain neuronal connections which are especially sensitised 
to determined stimuli: 
 
Figure 6:  Secondary records 
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Up to this point, Edelman’s hypothesis has been experimentally confirmed. But the 
most interesting thing lies in the third step for which, unfortunately, there is no direct 
empirical evidence: topographical maps. Topographical maps would be sets of groups 
of neurons which work at the same time and are bound by parallel reciprocal 
connections, termed the re-entries. However, according to Edelman (1992), indirect 
evidence exists: he believes that the retinoscope shows that in the visual perception of 
objects different groups of neurons collaborate, of which one deals with colours, another 
with movement and so on: 
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Figure 7:  Topographic maps 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                    
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Up to recently, Edelman’s theory was only a suggestive hypothesis to explain the 
process of neuronal integration of the codification of cerebral areas which produced a 
mental image. For example, related to the apple mentioned before, what would happen 
is that its form would excite a specific group of neurons, its colour a different one, its 
sheen another, etc., thus resulting in a topographic map. At the same time the sense of 
hearing would produce a second topographic map based on exciting groups of neurons 
which specialize in labial sounds, in anterior vowels, etc. A third topographic map 
would be made up of the mental image ¨apple¨, which is the result of previous 
experience with this fruit, and so on: 
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Figure 8: APPLE 
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The problem which Edelman faced is that in strictly localizationalist terms this 
hypothesis has only proven visual perception, it has hardly proven the other senses, and 
of course, it has not provided any proof of other faculties which are less bound to 
physiology such as remembering visual images or, even more so, thought (the concept 
¨apple¨) or language (the word apple). However, the relevant fact of this theory is that 
associations are not embodied in specific combinations of neurons. On the contrary, the 
vast amount of neuronal net-works are functionally degenerate, so any single function 
can be carried out by several non-identical neuronal configurations. This model enables 
us to bridge the gap between cognition and verbalization. While the genetic code 
provides for the anatomical topography of the brain, and stimuli overlap, linguistic 
wiring pathways presumably reorder these groups according to every particular verbal 
pattern. Instead of identifying the cognitive and the linguistic scene, the TNGS allows 
us to figure out the speech activity as a dynamic global activity, the so-called Recursive 
Synthesis, where the previously abstracted information, the concept, continuously 
receives re-entering linguistic maps forming a global mapping. 
The explanation above excludes that coordinate bilingualism can be right. If the mental 
networks that underlie visual images, concepts and words are partially similar, it stands 
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to reason that the mental network corresponding to apple and that corresponding to 
manzana have to share most of their connections: 
 
Figure 9 
 
 
However, surprisingly enough, the idea of coordinate bilingualism is not necessarily 
wrong. We know that people who are beginning to learn a second language usually 
think over in their first language the proposition they are trying to say, and finally give 
off a second language utterance, which inevitably exhibits some mixed linguistic 
features. The question now arises why coordinate bilingualim succeeds, although it 
should not. 
 
3. Lexicon-syntax interface 
The lexicon-syntax interface is one of the most controversial issues within grammar 
topics. Obviously, a word cannot be combined with any other word, thus certain 
lexemes determine others. For example, it would appear that a verb like eat can only 
lead prototypically to a direct complement defining something that can be eaten, such as 
apple, and take a subject like a human or an animal, for example, the girl, which gives 
us the sentence the girl is eating an apple and excludes *the sun is eating an apple or 
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*the girl is eating freedom. Given the girl and an apple have an independent referential 
entity, which is eating lacks, it is agreed that is eating governs the ordered pattern 
/animate subject...edible object/ in which the aforementioned terms are inserted the girl 
and an apple and not the reverse, although we could also draw up a list of verbs that can 
follow the girl as a subject in English. However, "prototypically" means that deviations 
are possible, ranging from what we usually call a collocation to the pure and simple 
idiom. The expression she eats money would be an extension of prototypical use of eat 
and we consider it to be a collocation because the variation of subject is quite limited as 
is the object (my car eats petrol, he eats books…). By contrast, the expression to eat 
one’s heart out, in which lexical possibilities are even smaller, is considered an idiom. 
 With respect to the lexical-syntactic relationship the proposals made conform to the 
aforementioned pattern. The syntax is a combination of terms and, naturally, to form the 
sentence the girl is eating an apple we must choose the lexemes girl, to eat, and apple 
from a store in our memory, check their mutual compatibility, and insert them in a 
suitable abstract sequence that is in turn compatible with the circumstances of the 
utterance, enabling this formal sentence to become a statement.  
 
To understand how interface processes can work neurologically we must consider the 
structure of memory (López-García, 2011). Basically there are two types of memory 
(Baddeley, 1982) that were differentiated by a number of experimental tests with further 
subdivisions in each: short-term memory (STM) and long-term memory (LTM). The 
first retains information for a few seconds whereas the second retains information for 
long periods that can last a lifetime; however, while STM reproduces the original 
accurately (enabling us to capture in our brain the image of a landscape from our retina 
or the melody of a song we hear), LTM is a mental process that can sometimes seriously 
alter the original perception. Obviously both lexicon and syntax belong to long-term 
memory, as the speaker resorts to mnemonic stores to choose a particular syntactic-
semantic pattern and certain suitable lexemes. Likewise, the listener breaks the message 
into its component parts, pattern and lexemes, and remembers them in the LTM. 
Naturally, this does not prevent the specific emission from lasting a few seconds in the 
STM for both interlocutors when the sentence is uttered. 
Another type of empirical determination enabled the differentiation within LTM of the 
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so-called implicit memory (non declarative) and explicit memory (declarative). Findings 
revealed that patients, mostly epileptic, who had undergone a lobotomy of the temporal 
lobe, particularly if it affected the hippocampus, were unable to recall facts and 
knowledge about the past, but were able to learn new skills, although they failed to 
remember when they did so. Something similar happened with amnesic patients or those 
with Alzheimer's who were able to recall a list of words when provided with the first 
syllable of each (priming) beforehand, but were unable to do so by making the 
conscious effort to remember them alone. This led to contrast two subtypes within long-
term memory, explicit and implicit memory (Squire & Kandel, 1999). 
 
With respect to explicit memory, its neural connections are fairly well known (Suzuki & 
Amaral, 1994). The hippocampus and parahippocampus make up the mnemic system of 
the medial temporal lobe, which belongs to the limbic system and, as such, is not part of 
the neocortex. The parahippocampus or rhinal cortex integrates multifunctional 
impulses (visual, auditory and somatic) carrying a single signal to the hippocampus 
(HP) where it is reprocessed by three successive layers (the dentatus gyrus, CA3 and 
CA1) to reach the subiculum, which re-dispatches the signal once more to the 
parahippocampal area and from there to the neocortex (Le Doux, 2002, 104): 
 
Figure 10 
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All these data come from research conducted on monkeys to test the processing of 
visual or acoustic stimuli and storage in the memory of visual images or melodies. This 
information has been extrapolated to humans because the experiments (which often 
maim the animals) are naturally forbidden on ethical grounds. The problem is how to 
proceed in the case of syntactic patterns and the words which fill them. When we 
acquire our native language patterns we mentally incorporate the lexemes at the same 
time. For example, the sentence the postman put the letter in the mailbox provides us 
with an actantial outline of the type "Agent - Object - Place", a verb put subcategorized 
specifically as putAg, Obj, Pl and three nouns postmanAnimate, which is a good 
candidate for the Agent, letterinanimate, which is a good candidate for the Object, and 
mailboxplace to store things, which is a good candidate for Place.  Initially these 
subcategorizations have a referential contextual basis, that is, they despatch to the 
visual, the auditory and somatic cortex although, with time, this is also established co-
textually. All this information is processed by the hippocampus (HP) following similar 
steps to those outlined in the figure above and is stored for a while in the limbic system: 
Figure 11 
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However, the patterns and lexemes do not follow the same course in the retrospective 
phase. Lexemes represent a type of knowledge that requires conscious cognitive effort 
to be retrieved, something that is not always achieved or achieved in varying degrees, 
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depending on the ability of the subject (compare the retrieval of a writer with that on 
ordinary speaker) or the inspiration of a given moment. By contrast, patterns are 
automatic, we extract them from our memory store as we need them and, furthermore, 
all native speakers of a language do it in the same way. All Spanish speakers have the 
same set of syntactic-semantic patterns, which has been inventoried as a paradigm, but 
not the same lexical availability with respect to lexemes. The same happens to English 
speakers in relation to their language. Hence it follows that the subiculum sends lexical 
information back to the neocortex, where it is stored, but not the information about 
syntactic semantic patterns. The latter face the same fate as other automatic-type 
cognitive and motor abilities, like riding a bike or recognizing the faces of friends, 
which are maintained by implicit memory and learnt by behavioural conditioning. 
All this leads us to assume that syntactic-semantic patterns are either processed by the 
hippocampus along with lexemes, but are then stored in parts of the limbic system 
unconnected to the cerebral cortex, or are deposited directly in the latter. However, even 
though patterns are automatic, the speaker has some control over them, because 
throughout one’s life some can change or their variational possibilities increase. Hence 
the first option seems the most reasonable. The patterns are similar in their memory 
function to the so-called habitual memory (deeply-rooted habits: Dudai, 1989)  and thus 
presumably stored in the caudate nucleus: 
Figure 12 
 
 
Figure 12 above explains how two languages interact when they meet in the same 
bilingual brain. Since lexemes and syntactic-semantic patterns are separately kept in the 
monolingual mind, no wonder that they continue this way in the bilingual one. For 
example, if these languages are English and Spanish, a theoretically attainable 
disposition would be as follows:  
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Figure 13a 
 
Figure 13a represents a bilingual pattern where the functional slots of a Spanish 
grammatical pattern are entirely filled in with English words, something like *to my 
mother her saw in the bakery, which consists of: 
       [a  mi  madre     la     vi  en  la  panadería] 
                                            to my mother  her   saw  in the bakery 
instead of the English well formed sentence I saw my mother in the bakery. The 
opposite mixed pattern would be *yo vi mi madre en la panadería, where the functional 
slots of an English grammatical pattern are filled in with Spanish words, as in:  
[I saw    my mother   in the bakery] 
    yo vi  mi madre  en la panadería 
which can be represented by figure 13b: 
Figure 13b 
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Needless to say that Spanglish, as a prototypical type of Spanish and English language 
contact, exhibits either tokens that approach 13a, like deliberamos groserías (“[we] 
deliver groceries”), or  tokens that approach 13b, like ahorita te llamo pa’trás (“I call 
you back right now”). Nevertheless type 13a does not exhibit real English lexemes 
inserted in Spanish patterns, but rather Spanish anglicisms inserted in Spanish patterns. 
This is due to the fact that Spanglish is a porous dialect of Spanish (López-García, 
2010), not of English, and people that speak Spanglish are aware that they yet remain 
inside the domain of the Spanish language despite their attempt to approach English as a 
L2. The most accurate representation of 13a would be then 13a’: 
Figure 13a’ 
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4. Coordinate and  compound bilinguals 
Figures 13a’ and 13b represent typically coordinate bilingual situations because the 
speakers do not master the English language. But the word “Spanglish” also refers in 
the literature to the code switching practiced by compound bilinguals who have a good 
knowledge of both languages. In this case there is a unique lexicon consisting of 
Spanish and English words and a unique set of grammatical patterns of both languages 
in spite of the speakers’ awareness that they are employing two languages: 
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Figure 14 
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Compound bilinguals do not store two separate lexicons in their brain because, as said 
above, words are not attached to its referent as a whole, but they rather belong to 
networks of features where perceptual and cognitive features are related to phonic 
labels. The organization of mental networks that include lexical items in the bilingual 
brain does not look like figure 15: 
Figure 15 
                                  estrella                                   star                                    
                                                                      
 
                                           
 
but it rather looks like figure 16: 
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Figure 16 
 
where A, B, C… are neural nodes that support whichever cognitive feature, be it 
perceptual –“bright”–, intellectual –“brilliant”–, or phonological –/estrélya/, /stár/–. 
Thus, an amazing contradiction arises: compound bilinguals [call them “Spanglish 
speakers I”], who practice Spanglish by means of code switching, are convinced they 
possess the two languages, English and Spanish, separately; on the contrary, coordinate 
bilinguals [call them “Spanglish speakers II”], who do not master the English language 
and who practice the filling of grammatical slots of one of the two languages with 
lexemes of the other, sometimes think they are speaking English and have a unique 
language in their brain any way. This contradiction is born because speakers have a 
metalinguistic awareness that does not necessarily fit their linguistic behavior. The 
situation can be summarized as follows: 
 
Figure 17 
 Type of discourse Metalinguistic 
awareness 
Linguistic behavior 
Compound bilinguals Code switching Two languages One neural network 
Coordinate bilinguals Language mixing One language Two neural networks 
                                             
 
Lexical variation belongs to the linguistic consciousness of the speakers of a language 
but does not strongly affect their feeling of forming a unique speech community. In fact, 
they know how to choose lexical items in order to approach the linguistic consciousness 
of the others. On the contrary, this seems rather difficult in syntactic variation because it 
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would be necessary to change the entire paradigm. Hence, intralinguistic variation 
especially characterizes lexical relations, whereas syntactic relations apply rather to 
interlinguistic variation (López-García, 2013): people are not surprised that English 
table is called mesa in Spanish, but are amazed when they learn that English to fall in 
love with someone is translated into Spanish as enamorarse de alguien. Consequently, 
employing lexical anglicisms, as coordinate bilinguals of Spanglish do, is conceived of 
as a kind of variation that distinguishes the speakers of Spanish in the US from the 
Spanish speaking people abroad, whereas employing alternative grammatical patterns, 
as compound bilinguals of Spanglish do, is considered to speak two separate languages. 
Consciousness, as argued by Blackmore (2003), is a delusion: in the case of Spanglish 
this delusion turns the empirical facts of linguistic behavior down. 
I have recently pointed out (López-García, 2012) that, although grammatical paradigms 
are located in the limbic system and lexical nets in the cortex, the awareness of both, 
that is their metalinguistic knowledge, belongs to the cortex for this is the realm of 
consciousness: 
Figure 18                                                                      
                                                                       
                                    CORTEX                                                                           CORTEX 
          
                                    LIMBIC SYSTEM                                                 LIMBIC SYSTEM 
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This explains the contradiction I have emphasized above. Since the neural network of 
perceptions, cognitions and linguistic features does not distinguish every language from one 
another, the performance of Spanglish speakers I, who are fluent in English and in Spanish, 
proceeds by changing constantly between both languages and by going from the cortex to 
the limbic system inside each of them. At the same time, however, this process is projected 
in the mirror of metalinguistic consciousness as a two languages system:                      
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Figure 19: Spanglish speakers I (compound bilinguals) 
                       Spanish                                        English 
                   Cortex                                               cortex 
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                           Metalinguistic mirror: two languages 
 
 
On the contrary, Spanglish speakers II simply insert pseudo English lexical items into 
the slots of Spanish grammatical patterns or Spanish words into the slots of pseudo 
English grammatical patterns, but project a single metalinguistic image, namely that 
there is only a language, Spanglish, no matter they consider it to be a dialect of Spanish, 
as it certainly is, or even of English: 
 
Figure 20: Spanglish speakers II (coordinate bilinguals) 
                                           Spanish     +      English 
                             cortex networks A      cortex networks B 
 
                               limbic networks A     limbic networks B 
 
 
 
 
                           Metalinguistic mirror: one language 
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5. Conclusion 
To conclude: Spanglish is a token of what I would like to call detranslation. As it is 
known, translation derives from the Latin TRANSLATIO, which itself comes from TRANS 
(“across”) and LATUM (the past participle of FERO, “to carry”). Detranslation is, then, 
the refusal to translate from A to B because of the assumption that both languages are 
compatible. Spanglish is not a new language which results of mixing two preceding 
languages. It is a linguistic behavior supported by the knowledge of two languages and 
the wish to put them together. Like translation detranslation belongs to performance, not 
to competence.  
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